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Lake Forest, Illinois 60045
By Antonio Damasio
Harvest/HBJ Book (2000)
Feeling a Feeling. This recurring theme in Antonio
Damasio’s The Feeling of What Happens boldly
attempts to engage us in an understanding of
consciousness. Damasio begins with a philosophical
commentary on the act of knowing the self and quickly
converges into his paradigm of “feeling a feeling”. No
harmony resonates with his existentialist divergence
and reductionist approach to consciousness. Damasio
ventures into the brain looking for avenues where his
theories may ring true while the reader is hopelessly left
outside his realm of reasoning.
Damasio’s first priority in The Feeling of What
Happens was to construct a model of consciousness
and conveniently provide vocabulary for his
revolutionary ideas. Some of these items include core
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , extended consciousness,
autobiographical self, and proto-self. I am reminded
here of Nobel laureate neuroscientist Stanley Prusiner,
who coined the term prion for an infectious protein
associated with several neurological diseases. In
essence, Prusiner constructed a model of an infectious
material before having scientific evidence that verified
its existence. Initially, Prusiner was highly criticized for
his early premonitions. Today, he has repeatedly
confirmed his previous inklings, yet several scientists
still disagree with his conclusions. Thinking outside the
box should be encouraged as well as criticized; this is
the nature of scientific progress. Although Damasio has
some evidence for his proposed model, he fallaciously
struggles to ad hoc results from neurological cases. In
other words, he constructs a theory that, on its own, is
not sufficient to explain the phenomena of
consciousness. Yet, he makes laborious efforts to drag
the reader through lofty textbook-like discussions on the
integrity of his paradigm. Primarily, this approach gives
the ending away before the book gets off the ground.
Damasio’s first priority soon begins to
consume the remaining text. He focuses most of his
energy on arguments toward fitting attractive
neurological manifestations into his model. He achieves
* This paper was written for BIO 346 Molecular Neuroscience, taught by
Dr. Shubhik DebBurman
this with some eloquence but loses the audience with
hypothetical and ornate assertions. He also creates
numbered lists for these assertions, which suggest a
concrete way of viewing the information, but become
cumbersome to read. In one such list, he outlines the
biological basis for emotions. Although his statements
seem logical, they are simply opinions. More novel
experiments need to be done to assess the validity of
these perceived truths.
Many of Damasio’s investigations lead me to
believe that he is trying to find the headquarters of
consciousness. He does this through his exploration of
core consciousness. After analyzing an uncommon
disease like Akinetic Mutism and a more common one
like Alzheimer’s Disease, he comes to a curious
conclusion. He proposes that the absence of emotion is
a reliable correlate of defective core consciousness.
Damasio further speculates that core consciousness is
located near the midline at the level of the brainstem.
One may soon see that a course in neuroanatomy
would be helpful to process the seemingly infinite
structures to which Damasio alludes. These structures
are phylogenetically the oldest structures of the brain,
and many other mammals have very similar structures
topographically. Does this conclusion imply that non-
human mammals experience “feelings of feelings”?
Damasio escapes speculation by ending the chapter on
that thought. He does, however, sparingly comment on
the intriguing plausibility of non-human consciousness
in later chapters.
Generally, Damasio has difficulty finding the
pinnacle seat of core consciousness (if it exists). What
he does with ease is artistically mold consciousness
into perceivable bodily representations. He claims that
the “brain is truly the body’s captive audience” (150).
The brain is constantly being updated on the visceral
and musculoskeletal apparatus of the body. He bridges
the brain and the body together to comment on the
nature of consciousness. Damasio coins this bridge the
proto-self, defined as a “collection of neural patterns
which map, moment by moment, the state of the
physical structure of the organism” (154). However, he
soon reverts to his old ways and attempts to find the
area in which the proto-self is represented. This
problematic because he is trying to find the location of a
structure that he has created.
The level of reductionism he assumes is
arbitrary. A holistic understanding of consciousness
would encompass many disciplines including
philosophy, psychology, physiology, molecular biology,
and biophysics. Damasio does not comment upon this
issue thoroughly, which is fundamental to his field of
study. He looks at consciousness through the lenses of
a modularist. This is not evident to the reader because
he takes a complex approach indicative to his
paradigm. The paradigm he uses places consciousness
in a spectrum with two extremes and many shades of
gray. Expanding on the previous argument, Damasio
attempts to reduce the location of the proto-self to
several locations: brain-stem nuclei, hypothalamus,
insular cortex, cortices known as S2, and the medial
parietal cortices. This methodology may appear to be
holistic but, deceivingly, is not. He has created his own
terminology and locates them on his own. This idea is
scientifically ungrounded because it fails to be testable.
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Only Damasio can truly verify the anatomical
representations of the p r o t o - s e l f . To query
consciousness on one anatomical level is like trying to
understand the physical world in three dimensions.
Three-dimensions serves as a good model of reality,
but it does not comment upon the fourth-dimension of
the space-time continuum developed by Einstein. When
a physicist wants to send a rocket into space, he uses
Newtonian physics. However, when dealing with
theoretical frameworks of time travel, a more powerful
theory is naturally necessary. Damasio’s theory is a
good model but it does not explain the reality of
consciousness.
I am, as are many, hesitant to refute any of
Damasio’s arguments because I am afraid that I do not
understand the full extension of his premises. Damasio
is confident in what he is communicating, but he does it
in a nonspecific way. There seems to be a motivation
for this. Being a popular science book, he would like to
not only touch the avid neurologist but, more
importantly, the lay person. Damasio reaches no
agreement between the writing styles directed to these
very different audiences. As he stumbles and struggles
to communicate his ideas to two audiences, the reader
must make a great effort to digest the text, which
requires Buddhist-l ike concentration to be
comprehended satisfactorily. If you are so inclined, a
second reading is recommended. You may then grasp
the profoundness of his achievement.
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